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Wireless Sensor Network
• Wireless networks consisting of a large number of motes
– Self-organizing
– Highly integrated with changing environment and network
– Highly constrained resources
• processing, storage, bandwidth, power
• Facilitate large scale deployment
– Health care monitoring
– Surveillance
– Traffic monitoring
– Military applications
– Habitat monitoring
– Disaster Warning
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• ATmega128L 8-bit processor at 8 
MHz
• 128KB program memory (flash)
• 512KB additional data flash memory
• 433, 868/916, or 310 MHz multi-
channel radio transceiver
• 38.4 kbps radio, 500-1000 feet 
outdoor range (depending on 
versions) with a size of only 58 x 32 
x 7 (mm)
• Usually it is run by TinyOS operating 
system and powered by 2 AA sized 
batteries
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MICA2 Mote: An Example
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4An Application Scenario
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• Viewing Angle 1
– (a) Key Management
– (b) Secure Routing     
– (c) Secure Services
– (d) Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [outsider, insider]
• Viewing Angle 2
– (a) Physical security
– (b) Deployment security (sparse or dense, etc.)   
– (c) Topological security (cluster, hierarchy, tree, etc.)
– (d) Wireless communication security
– (e) Data security
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WSN Security Angles
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• Viewing Angle 3: Holistic Security
– (a) Application layer security
– (b) Transport layer security
– (c) Network layer security
– (d) Data link layer security
– (e) Physical layer security
• Holistic Security!
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WSN Security Angles
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• Densely deployed sensors in the network
• Initially all the nodes and the base station (BS) have 
same transmission ranges
• All nodes and the BS are time-synchronized
• Once deployed, sensors remain relatively static
• BS cannot be compromised in any way
• All transmissions from a node are isotropic (in all 
directions or local broadcast)
• Links between two nodes are bidirectional
• Each node has a pre-loaded shared secret key with BS 
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Assumptions & Preliminaries
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• Three states of nodes
– Non-forwarding
• Radio transceiver is OFF but sensing circuitry is ON
– Forwarding
• Both transceiver and the sensing circuits remain ON
– Active
• This is same as forwarding state but this term is used to differentiate 
two phases of the protocol‟s operation 
• Initially all nodes are in active state for some time
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Preliminaries
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• Active State Time:
– Let, v be a node and N1(v) be the number of one hop neighbors 
of v for a particular transmission range r. Let, Trtt be the round 
trip time for data propagation between the longest distant pair 
within one hop neighbors. Then, the active state time for v is 
given by the equation, Tactive = Trtt × N1(v)
• In our protocol, within the time Tactive, a node could be 
able to determine whether it should participate in the tree 
as a forwarding node or not
• One-way Hash Chain (OHC) [Lamport, 1979]:
– A sequence of numbers Kn, Kn-1, …. K0 such that, i:0 ≤ i < n, 
Ki = F(Ki+1)
– F → One-way function that is repeatedly applied on a seed Kr
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Assumptions & Preliminaries
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• Tree Construction and OHC Initialization
– Base station B initiates the network formation process and 
generates a control packet
bcm: B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0|MACKi
(B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0)
Here,
• sid → sender‟s id
• ren → remaining energy of the sender
• dist → cumulative distance from B, calculated using signal strength
• fid → id of the selected immediate upstream forwarder
• HS0 → initial hash number
• MACKi
→ Message Authentication Code generated by using key Ki, 
which is the number in the key chain corresponding to time slot ti
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Tree Construction & OHC init.
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– One hop neighbors of BS first get the message
– Each node receiving the control message stores HS0
from the first received message 
– Each node calculates the distance up to base station 
via different upstream nodes and chooses the node 
as a forwarder of which Ds/Er is the lowest
– Each node also stores the ids of the sending nodes
– Each node waits for time, Twait = {Ds/Er}×R. R is the 
ratio of a node‟s initial energy and transmission range
– After Twait node senses the channel and re-transmits
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Tree Construction & OHC init.
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– The re-transmitted message includes the node‟s 
information and fid is set as the chosen forwarder 
node‟s id
– As the link is bidirectional, the re-transmission of the 
message by the downstream node is heard by the 
upstream nodes and the forwarder knows that, the 
downstream node chose itself as a forwarder
– This process continues and eventually the whole 
network is structured as a sink rooted tree
– To authenticate HS0, BS releases Ki in time slot ti+d
– Non-forwarding nodes are set within Tactive
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Tree Construction & OHC init.
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• Before execution of first phase
• All the white nodes are in active 
status.
• We have shown the N-hop (N = 
1, 2, 3 …) neighbors of the sink 
on the circumference of the same 
circle regardless of their actual 
calculated distances from the 
sink.
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Before Execution of the Phase 1
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Reference Modelbcm:
B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0|MACKi(B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0)
Network Structuring
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• After execution of first phase
• The gray nodes are in non-
forwarding status while the 
other two nodes are in 
forwarding status. In these 
figures, we have shown the N-
hop (N = 1, 2, 3 …) neighbors of 
the BS on the circumference of 
the same circle regardless of 
their actual calculated distances 
from the base station
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After Execution of Phase 1
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Network Operation and Secure Data Transmission from sensor to BS
To validate OHC number, each intermediate node n1, n2, ... , nm maintains a 
verifier Ins
for each ns. ns is the source node.
 Bogus packet is detected in the very next hop and cannot travel far, which 
saves the network from consuming unnecessary energy
 Repeated checking of OHC number to handle packet loss for particular 
source
Secure Data Transmission
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• Optional Key Refreshment
– Depending upon the requirement or application at 
hand. It provides data freshness and better security
– BS periodically broadcasts a message, 
B|Ks| MACKj
(B|Ks) with a new session key Ks
– Authentication of Ks is done as previous
– Each node or the targeted set of nodes perform X-OR 
operation with their current shared key to get the new 
key 
– This key is used for encryption of data while sending
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Optional Key Refreshment
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• Broken Path Recovery
– Stored knowledge of upstream nodes is used for this
– Sometimes, OHC re-initialization is necessary, 
periodic re-construction  finding out an optimal 
value of re-initialization of the network is left as our 
future work
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Broken Path Recovery
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Broken Path Repaired Path
Figures to Explain
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• Energy-efficient structuring of the network
• Bogus packets cannot travel more than one hop which 
saves consumption of energy
• Periodic re-structuring keeps the balance of energy drain 
of the nodes
• The entire network can show some sort of graceful 
degradation
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Energy Gains
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• Hop by hop authentication checking for each packet from 
each source node
• Base station also can detect false packet and stops any 
further transmission from the rogue node
• Refreshed Key, if needed in the application
• Outsider Attack
– No chance. Will be detected
• Insider Attack
– Compromised nodes
– BS accepts data if at least δ nodes send the same report
– Periodic re-initialization of OHC is helpful
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About Security
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• Scopes of future research
– Finding an optimal value for network restructuring
– Developing an IDS and merging it with these two 
mechanisms to provide a complete security 
management solution
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Future Research Directions
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